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Buddhism as a Religion of Hope: 
Observations on the “Logic” of a 
Doctrine and its Foundational Myth
Lu is  O. g 6 mez
The gift, to be true, must be the flowing of the giver unto me, 
correspondent to my flowing unto him.
R. W. Emerson1
1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Gifts,” in Essays, Second series (Boston and New York: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1975: 163. The first edition, 1844). One must take excep­
tion to the views expressed by Emerson further down the same page regarding the gift o f  “the 
Buddhist man” (163-64).
2 The talk was given in April 1983 at the Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute 
o f  Otani University in Kyoto.
THIS paper is written from a perspective that may strike some readers as unusual. It was originally conceived as a public talk that began as an 
exercise in the interpretation of a religious narrative (“the myth of 
Dharmakara”) but soon turned into an exercise in theological speculation.2 
Thus, by following my own thoughts I fell upon an exercise of the imagina­
tion that illustrated for me the close tie that exists between translating words 
and ideas and imagining sacred worlds.
As translation, the original lecture and the present paper are an attempt to 
understand a family of Buddhist beliefs that seems to baffle some inter­
preters of Buddhism. Although this family is often designated as “Pure Land 
Buddhism” or “the Pure Land tradition,” it encompasses much more than 
what is regarded as “Pure Land” in East Asia and the West. I will retain the
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expression “Pure Land Buddhism,15 “Pure Land” for short, only because it is 
more convenient than a fully descriptive label. Expressed more accurately, 
the referent for these phrases would have to read something along the fol­
lowing lines: Pure Land Buddhism is a family of beliefs and practices asso­
ciated with that genre of Buddhist texts that describes the purified buddha- 
fields, their constitution and lay-out, and the conditions under which a 
human being can hope to reach such buddha-fields.
This family of beliefs has been represented in various ways throughout the 
history of Buddhism. Although the scholarly literature of the modem age has 
tended to conflate “Pure Land,” “Amidism,” and “Shinshu belief,” they are 
not synonymous (and the second is problematic at best). My use of a broad 
term and my loose use of “Pure Land” to refer to this diverse family of 
beliefs is meant to signal its common ground in a mythology that links the 
vows of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, their saving grace and power, and the 
purification of buddha-fields. This is the common ground for a constellation 
of beliefs that includes a wide variety of Amitabha-Amitayus beliefs and 
practices, similar systems focusing on other Buddhas (e.g., Maitreya and 
Bhaisajyaguru), as well as lesser known, mostly literary witnesses to similar 
beliefs. By referring in this essay mostly to the mythology of the Larger 
Sukhavativyuha, I do not wish to imply that there are no important differ­
ences among various members of this larger family of Buddhist beliefs.
Ironically, our understanding of Pure Land Buddhism has been hampered 
by the putative proximity or similarity of its beliefs and practices to Western 
notions of divinity, paradise, and salvation. And, with the first person pro­
noun in the phrase “our understanding” I refer to both Western and East 
Asian interpreters. The Western observer tends to dismiss Pure Land Bud­
dhism as not quite “Buddhism,” and too much like “Christianity.” Japanese 
Pure Land Buddhists spend much energy trying to distance their theological 
discourse from that of their Christian brethren.
But even a sympathetic reading of Pure Land Buddhism must face some 
difficulties in the conception of Pure Land faith. One can recognize and 
address sympathetically both its parallels and its fundamental differences 
with respect to systems of belief that may be called “theistic” (and these 
would have to include much more than just Christianity). Yet one is left with 
some puzzlement. It is not that Pure Land Buddhism is less (or more for that 
matter) consistent than other systems of religious belief, theistic, non-theis- 
tic, or of other types. Rather, my point is that certain problematic or baffling 
points of doctrine are seldom examined in part because so much energy is
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spent in distancing Pure Land from Buddhism, as well as from Christianity.3 
Regardless of its possible connections or similarities to other systems of 
belief, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, a series o f problematic polarities coalesce 
in the Pure Land system o f belief.4 These include the following: (1) the coex­
istence o f notions o f merit with concepts o f grace, (2) belief in the inevitabil­
ity o f suffering next to an expectation o f redemption (or, rather, to be more 
accurate, assurance o f salvation), and (3) ascetic ideals o f liberation coupled 
with an avowed confidence in the existence of a power that can and will res­
cue the suffering person. Additionally, at the level o f imagery, ideals that 
presume a denial of, or an escape from, worldly aims are placed next to or
3 Simplistic identifications with forms o f  Christian belief have not helped. Alexandra 
Valignano, a Jesuit visitor to Japan in 1579, claimed that Japanese Pure Land Buddhists “hold 
precisely the doctrine which the devil, father o f  both, taught to Luther” (Re-visioning 
"Kamakura" Buddhism, ed. by Richard Payne [Honolulu: University o f  H aw aii Press, 
1998], 101). The idea goes back to a letter (1571) o f  Francisco Cabral, according to Florenz 
(“Die Japaner,” in Lehrbuch der Religions-Geschicht, ed. by P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye 
[Tubingen: Mohr, 1925], vol. 1, 398). Formal parallels were recognized in a more generous 
vein by the Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968). In a long footnote in vol. 1, part 2  o f  
his Kirchliche Dogmatik (3rd ed. Zollikon-ZUrich: Evangelischer Verlag a.g., 1945: 372-77; 
English version Church Dogmatics, ed. by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance [New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons. Vol. 1 ,2 ,1956], 340-44), he claimed that Pure Land Buddhism was 
the only parallel to Reform theology outside Christianity— most likely because he was not 
cognizant o f  Hindu and Muslim parallels. His opening remarks are worth quoting, because 
they show how complex and subtle was the mind o f  this theologian even at a juncture where 
his apologetic agenda is transparent: “We can regard it as a wholly providential disposition 
that as far as I can see the most adequate and comprehensive and illuminating heathen paral­
lel to Christianity, a religious development in the Far East, is parallel not to Roman or Greek 
Catholicism, but to Reformed Christianity, thus confronting Christianity with the question o f  
its truth even as the logical religion o f  grace (konsequente Gnadenreligion).” [The word “hea­
then” is in quotation marks in the German edition, but not in the English.] Barth appears to 
confuse Francisco Cabral with his more famous namesake, Francis Xavier (loc. cit.); Barth 
does not cite his sources. I could not find a similar notion in the writings o f  Francis Xavier. 
(Francisco Javier, Cartas y  escritos de San Francisco Javier. Unica publicacidn castellana 
completa segun la edicibn critica de Monumenta historica Soc. Jesu, 1944-1945. Anotada 
por el padre Felix Zubillaga, S. I. 2nd ed. [Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968]).
4 1 use the phrase “system o f  belief ’ loosely, and as shorthand for “a constellation o f  fam­
ilies o f  belief and practice.” I do not mean to imply that these beliefs or practices fonned part 
o f  or derived from a complete or closed theological system (I am not sure such systems can 
exist in the strict sense o f  the phrase). Needless to say, at several points in the history o f  Pure 
Land Buddhist beliefs, attempts have been made to systematically consolidate belief or to 
close the system.
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expressed by way of images of bliss and comfort that are less than ascetic.3 *5
3 Here, as in the title o f the paper, I use “foundational myth” to indicate the narratives and 
tropes that the tradition sees as its foundational event. There is no implication that I regard 
these narratives, or the texts in which we find them today, as the true or ultimate origin o f  the 
tradition. Furthermore, as I shall explain in  more detail below, I  use the word “myth” as a 
loose term for those aspects o f belief and doctrine that are constituted b y narratives or im ag-
inal depictions o f sacred events. I call these myths whether they are seen as “foundational”
(that is, as the first or pivotal events that form the groundwork for the tradition’s conviction 
that it carries the truth) or as “ideal” (that is, as descriptions o f the way things w ill be or 
should be).
6  Here too I use the terms loosely: I am not talking o f a formal logic or a syllogistic neces­
sity; rather I refer to the way in which the tradition sees certain steps in the narrative itself, 
and subsequently in its interpretation, as somehow necessary or as somehow “making sense” 
as events or arguments that call for certain beliefs. This particular use o f “logic” is accepted 
in modem English, and is  illustrated in part by the following quotations from the definition of 
“logic” in the tenth edition o f the M erriam -W ebster’s  Collegiate D ictio n ary  (1998): “interre­
lation or sequence o f facts or events when seen as inevitable or predictable.”
My effort at understanding these dichotomies is, at best, preliminary and 
schematic. A baffling belief, an apparently contradictory set of beliefs, or an 
apparently irrational belief does not yield meaning readily, and usually calls 
for a variety of analytical strategies. In this paper I will outline what I 
believe is one possible strategy, one that stands critically outside the tradi­
tion, yet attempts to understand what makes the tradition meaningful from 
within. This I call the clarification of the “inner logic” of the belief system.6
This interpretation is in part motivated by a strong interest in communica­
tion across cultures—partly for professional reasons, partly for reasons of 
life experience. In the context of such experiences and explorations I have 
adopted a hypothesis about the relationship of theology to culture that seems 
to me the most reasonable despite the difficulties inherent to any attempt to 
test it. This hypothesis postulates a hierarchy of meaning (not necessarily of 
value) between culture and theology. I propose that the complexities of com­
munication, translation, and interpretation and the problems that attend these 
processes are superordinate on problems of “theological” interpretation, 
understood both as exegesis and scholarly clarification.
This working hypothesis is shaped to a great extent by a conception of 
doctrine (including cases where doctrine is coextensive with text) as both 
cultural artifact and human engagement (the two notions are not mutually 
exclusive). This conception can be applied to Pure Land belief systems in the
4
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following schematic way. A belief in the power of a Buddha’s solemn 
promise entails a commitment that engages a person’s behavior (and poten­
tially the imaginal objects upon which they place their trust and hope). But 
such engagement is possible because the beliefs (narratives, confessional 
statements, ritual acts) are part of a cultural world the reality of which is 
beyond question. That is to say, the cultural world of belief is, like a ritual 
object, a concrete artifact in human imagination. The artifact is only partly 
represented by the text (as book, performance or recitation). It is also present 
in the mental landscape and the discourse of believers. For an outsider to 
grasp the full implication and the subjective meaningfulness of the belief 
and the practice, this outsider must come to understand the logic of this 
imaginal world.
As a philologist, I am interested in texts and in trying to understand what 
texts mean in a particular historical context In spite of my belief that the 
Buddhist tradition has much to commend itself, the relevance of Buddhism 
is no reason for erasing the historical and geographical differences that exist 
within the tradition and between this and other traditions. Moreover, and this 
may be more crucial, understanding cannot take place if one ignores the cul­
tural gaps that separate believers among themselves and believers from non­
believers. These are gaps that occur in actual time and space, as well as in the 
imaginal spaces of culture and habit.
I therefore consider the following a useful corollary to my main working 
hypothesis: Buddhist values and beliefs exist in cultural contexts that may be 
radically different from my own, and hence my inability to understand them 
may be rooted in deep cultural differences. This is only a hypothesis, and I 
am willing to discard it if the evidence points elsewhere. But it is a reason­
able hypothesis that also entails the possibility of incommensurable 
worlds—that is, the possibility that my world and that of the believer simply 
cannot meet. Incommensurability can also take a stronger form. This strong­
er form is as follows: even if I were to adopt wholeheartedly one of these 
beliefs, immersing myself in the culture that produces, maintains, and holds 
it, abandoning all contact with my own culture, even then I would still be 
unable to penetrate fully the meaning of the doctrine.
For lack of space I cannot explore here my preferred view of incommen­
surability, which is the following. I believe I can never fully penetrate even 
the meanings of my own culture, let alone those of other cultures. But this 
impossibility in fact reveals the fallacy of imagining culture as fully realized
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or as a bounded, discreet and stable entity. Culture—and religion as a cul­
tural phenomenon—is constantly recreated. In a manner of speaking, culture 
is recreation of meanings. Culture cannot be abstracted from the struggle of 
individuals and subgroups to make sense of a vast pool of preconceptions 
and symbols whose meanings not only exist in potency, but actually most 
likely simply do not exist until they are understood and turned into human 
behaviors. Thus, culture is always simultaneously emerging, diverging and 
converging, and no single individual or group can claim to grasp (possess or 
understand) the totality of the process.
I believe such cultural reflections must also shape the task of the theolo­
gian. I am assuming that the moment theologians feel the impulse to explain, 
clarify or rationalize doctrine, they are thereby recognizing the degree to 
which religion, as part of culture, is ephemeral and evasive. Similarly, the 
effort to understand theologically should be seen in some ways as a symp­
tom of the barriers that stand between individuals and between cultures, as 
well as within an individual’s multiple readings of the religious tradition 
upon which that individual lays a claim.
Needless to say, the theological enterprise is also hermeneutical, not only 
in that it attempts to understand a tradition as the intentions of an ancestral 
mind, or the intentions of other living individuals, authoritative or heretical. 
Theology also tries to make sense of a changing world, and hence part of the 
frustration of the theological enterprise is built into the virtually impossible 
task of preserving beliefs that claim relevance for all human circumstances 
at all times, but were produced by some human beings at a particular time.
Hence, at all levels of theological discourse one is faced with a constant 
need to respond—that is, not “reply,” but respond—accounting for the tra­
dition and the world by some sort of adaptation. In this sense communica­
tion with a tradition (and between cultures) shares some elements with 
communication between individuals within a given culture. Effective inter­
personal communication at the level of social equals often requires that one 
person walk halfway to the other person even as the other person walks 
halfway towards the first person. When this type of interaction takes place, 
communication is transformation.
When this model of communication is applied to religion, even the work 
of the historian becomes one of persuasion—to say nothing of the work of 
the theologian. Persuasion need not be irenic or gentle, but the suasive func­
tion of interpretation is inherent to the process of understanding. And I
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would argue that this is true whether the speaker (writer) is claiming to use 
“critical” methods or is attempting to read his doctrinal or cultural meanings 
with a method claiming to be totally neutral (as the so-called phenomeno­
logical understandings were supposed to be). I would go even further and 
argue that in this sense any process of interpretation in religion is inevitably 
a process of theological persuasion.
In making sense of another, the interpreter is transformed—at the very 
least interpreters attempt to transform each other. If the object of interpreta­
tion is a tradition and the representatives of that tradition are trying to make 
themselves understood, they too will be transformed. And, I repeat and 
expand, transformation is not necessarily gentle or voluntary, and is seldom 
fully conscious.
The original audience for this paper included many persons who were not 
historians of Buddhism but Shinshu believers and theologians.7 Hence I felt 
a special need to include these preliminary reflections on my particular 
approach to the interpretation of religious doctrines. This approach assumes 
certain notions that are not commonly used by committed interpreters of 
Buddhism. These include notions that derive from the general history of 
religions, and also concepts of religious language and symbol. In that sense, 
they may be notions that are purely scholarly, and not wholly intelligible 
to believers. I propose that such notions may be helpful to the committed 
believer, as well as to the professional scholar. I now leave this prelimi­
nary note and focus on the question of the interpretation of Pure Land 
Buddhism.
For a significant period in the history of the contemporary scholarly study 
of Buddhism, doctrine was privileged as the only key to understanding 
Buddhist belief and practice. Even when the importance of ritual and devo­
tion was recognized, the philosophical framework of the literate tradition
7 The word “theology” is here shorthand for “committed systematic reflection on religious 
doctrine and practice.” This means that in my view “theology” is an adequate word to connote 
a peculiar use o f  human imagination and rational thought that is committed, religious, and 
systematic. It is committed because it is carried out by a person who feels and expresses a 
sense o f  fealty to the tradition that is the object o f  this sort o f  thought. It is systematic, because 
it seeks an ordering o f  doctrine and practice that will be cogent, comprehensive, and ratio­
nally elegant. It is to be distinguished from philosophy only by the degree o f  the thinker’s 
explicit commitment to a particular doctrinal frame, and from confessional discourse by the 
degree o f  critical or rational reflection on the doctrinal system.
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was assumed to be the only way to understand religious feeling, belief, and 
practice. This period in Buddhist scholarship is now finished among the spe­
cialists, but the effects of the earlier attitude linger on. Furthermore, believ­
ers have yet to begin appreciating the potential value of rethinking religion 
as something more than doctrine and belief.
Westerners tend to emphasize the critical and ascetic elements of 
Buddhism. For many Western observers, Pure Land is not consistent with 
this elite philosophical dimension of the tradition. Many perceive Pure Land 
as a ‘'simplification” of Buddhism, or, at best, a concession to those unable 
to practice meditation. One purpose of this paper is to argue against that 
position.8
Now there are some good reasons for this Western understanding of 
Buddhism. I think it is undeniable that Buddhism produced several systems 
of critical philosophy. Buddhism, like other philosophies that developed at 
the same time, was a system or family of systems that questioned tradition­
al beliefs. Such questioning, we believe, resonates with modem agnosticism. 
Whether this identification is anachronistic or not is not as crucial as the fact 
that we imagine classical Buddhism as a demythologized system of beliefs 
and practices. (There are of course other elements of Buddhism, but at this 
point I am concentrating on this aspect.) To conceive of Buddhism as only a 
philosophy, or as only a critical philosophy, is to misunderstand the theo­
logical functions of critical theology. But there is such a critical element, and 
I want to underline that first.
Paul Mus used to discuss the outline of the Upanisads in the following 
way. He understood the conception of the atman, qt the self, as an extended 
(or social) self, and the Upanisads were then seen as a critique of this notion 
of self. So the Brahmanic theory would be one in which the social self was
8 I made similar arguments many years ago, but within the context of a book review, and 
my apologia may have been misconstrued as a criticism (“Shinran’s Faith and the Sacred 
Name o f Amida,” in Monumenta Nipponica, 38-1, Spring 1983: 73-84, which was followed 
by a rejoinder by the authors of the book reviewed, Ueda and Hirota, in Monumenta 
Nipponica, 38-4, Winter 1983: 413-17, and Gdmez’s surrejoinder: 418-27). My remarks 
were critical insofar as they questioned the way in which Mahayana doctrines have been 
frozen or fossilized on the basis o f particular readings o f  selected Indian sdstras. This stan­
dardization of orthodoxy, which began in India itself, is only one set o f  readings o f Buddhist 
practice and belief. It ignores the potential for growth and creativity suggested by the imagery 
o f the sutras and by actual Buddhist belief and practice.
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emphasized, and the Upanisads were a critique of that notion, still con­
ceived, of course, in mystical-religious terms. Mus argued, furthermore, that 
Buddhism was a religious and social manifestation of this same critique.9 
One could further develop these ideas by suggesting that, as a critique of the 
individual self, Buddhism could be understood as consisting of two move­
ments or two parts. One movement is the deconstruction of the self. This is 
seen in meditations such as the meditation on the body, in which the medi­
tator imagines breaking up the self or the body into parts. There is also the 
transformation of the self, or the development of the self. In this case, the 
meditator reviews, visualizes, or constructs all the qualities of a Buddha or 
of buddha-like thoughts.
But a problem arises the moment you try to transform the self, or create a 
new self. This is done by moral progress or moral growth, or simply by ritu­
al representation. Either way, one assumes a certain notion of building up 
the self. There is of course a tension between the deconstructive and the con­
structive process. Also in the notion of construction by moral development 
we get the idea or the metaphor of moral acquisition. In this practice, we see 
a repetition of the notion of a social self. The social self is constructed by 
acquiring life and property. In the same way you construct a religious or 
moral self by acquiring moral property, and this notion of acquisition of a 
moral self is expressed in India by the notion of merit (punya). In the same 
way that in society you become rich if you work hard, in the spiritual realm 
if you work hard you will acquire spiritual wealth, i.e. merit. This metaphor 
is common among religions of salvation (or human perfectibility), but it is 
especially strong in India.
Traditions do not always make explicit the parallels between the accumu­
lation of wealth and growth toward spiritual perfection as a sort of accumu­
lation of “goods.” In fact, in the classical literature of Buddhism, the 
connection is seldom made even metaphorically, although in practice the 
parallel and the cause-effect relationship is obvious. Furthermore, the con­
nection between accumulation and expenditure, having and giving, which 
takes a special importance in so-called “gift economies,” is central to a num-
9 This summary o f my teacher’s views follows class notes from my graduate student days, 
but some o f these ideas may be found in his later writings, such as “The Problematic o f  the 
Self—West and East and the Mandala Pattern,” in Charles A. Moore, ed.» Philosophy and 
Culture East and West: East- West Philosophy in Practical Perspective (Honolulu: University 
o f Hawai’i Press, 1962), 594-610.
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ber of Buddhist religious metaphors but is maintained only in an implicit 
form (wealth in merit increases the more you share the merit). However, it is 
not necessary to posit or prove an overlap between religious and economic 
meanings to understand that the metaphor of “merit” is structurally similar 
to common images of acquiring, losing, and giving wealth. Additionally, the 
giving of merit follows the rules that apply to gifts generally: it has no ulti­
mate value, yet, in being given, it acquires infinite value.10
10 On the gift as a form o f exchange that is homologous with or determinant o f  religious 
symbol and ritual, see Gerardus van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation: A 
Study in Phenomenology, trans, by J. E. Turner (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938): sec­
tions 1 3 -2 ,50-1 , 70, and 76-2 , which discuss the power o f  the king, sacrifice, covenant, and 
the love o f  God respectively in relation to gifts.
11 See Gdmez, “Two Jars on Two Tables: Reflections on the Two Truths,” in Jonathan Silk, 
ed., Wisdom and Compassion: The Buddhist Studies Legacy o f  G. M. Nagao (Honolulu: 
University o f  H aw aii Press, forthcoming).
This complex set of metaphors plays an implicit role in Buddhism at two 
levels: a rhetoric of the emptiness of merit (or, no merit is the best merit), 
and a rhetoric o f the accumulation of infinite merit. The first of these two 
doctrinal or rhetorical constructs is expressed in common renderings of the 
so-called “Perfection of Wisdom” or “Madhyamika” dialectic. In these sys­
tems, the religious ideal is placed beyond all notions of acquisition. It is not 
that Madhyamika philosophy exists in a disembodied state.11 Rather, the 
issue is the rhetoric of Perfection of Wisdom literature and Madhyamika, 
both of which tend to undermine the notions of merit and possession of 
merit.
But, another way of making this critique is by changing the order of time, 
in other words, by trying to express the time that is required for spiritual 
progress in paradoxical terms. So you can say, for example, that it would 
require an infinite time to acquire the merit you need, and that is one way of 
denying or rejecting the quantifiable notion of virtue. This is the second 
rhetoric of merit.
Thus, I propose, for the sake of simplicity, two models of Buddhist cri­
tiques of quantifiable virtue. One of them is the negative way, which we may 
call the model of “zero merit.” This is a way of saying that the process of 
“acquiring virtue” or becoming perfect is never quite mathematical, that it 
strives toward a dimension that is not a true dimension at all. Another way 
of expressing a similar idea is by saying that merit is quantifiable but in mea­
sureless amounts, which we may call the rhetoric of “infinite,” or “measure-
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less merit.” This is the same thing as saying that the sacred becomes, under 
certain conditions, immeasurable— it cannot be reduced to any other quanti­
ty and thus becomes non-quantifiable. These are, I believe, not theological 
claims (though they may be read as such).12 Rather they are claims regard­
ing the logic o f a certain type o f religious rhetoric. These two approaches 
express the two extremes or ends of all numbers, at least poetically, if  not 
mathematically.
The zero merit position is close to Madhyamika or similar systems. In 
Japan, the Zen tradition sometimes comes close to this. The infinity position 
is found in some sutras, and I think this is an important point in the Pure 
Land tradition o f India. Infinite merit is measureless merit. It has a quantity, 
its value is not zero, but it is not quantifiable. The Bodhisattva’s path is sup­
posed to lead to infinite merit. And the way to attain infinite merit is by giv­
ing up all merit.
The logic o f this doctrine is based on the assumption that the greatest 
merit comes from detachment. It follows then that detachment from merit is 
the greatest merit. At some uncertain point in the history o f Buddhism, it 
became a widely accepted belief that merit could be dedicated (invested, if 
you will) to a particular purpose. For instance, one had the hypothetical 
option o f dedicating one’s merit toward the attainment of buddhahood or to 
rebirth in one o f the celestial spheres. But one could also opt to dedicate 
merit (including the merit derived from the ritual o f dedication itself) to the 
benefit o f other persons (parents, children, all sentient beings).
This ideal or imaginal process, which we would associate in a secular con­
text with the culture o f gift-giving, is called technically punya-parinamand 
(eko IB r&] in Japanese). The second member of this compound (parindmana) 
already suggests change, as the term means “bringing to maturity.” Hence, 
to dedicate merit means making it fructify. When one dedicates or hands 
over merit to a purpose, especially for the benefit o f another, merit brings its 
fruit. In fact the greatest o f all merits derives from abandoning merit. This is 
o f course a paradox, but I think it a beautiful and powerful paradox. One 
may think that it is hypocritical to say I give up merit to gain merit. But that 
is putting the emphasis on the wrong place, because it is not “I give merit to 
gain merit” but rather “I give merit.”
12 And, needless to say, the concepts lend themselves for a variety of theological polemics. 
For instance, Christian theologians, and Buddhist scholars from a Christian background or 
persuasion, would insist that immeasurable and infinite are not synonymous. But I am not 
persuaded that the classical Buddhists would have made such distinctions.
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Hie doctrine of merit transference has pervaded, in one form or another, 
all o f Buddhism. It is however more closely associated with Mahayana and 
the origins of Mahayana. If we agree that most of Mahayana directs itself 
against the notion of quantifiable merit, then the ideal of Mahayana is some­
how beyond merit, whether you express it as zero or infinity. But still the 
believer sees himself as separate from the ideal. Consequently it becomes 
necessary to explain somehow the mechanism or process that leads to 
enlightenment. So you can either say the ideal is beyond, or if you want to 
erase (this difference) and have sudden enlightenment, then the ideal coin­
cides with reality. If you are speaking from the zero point of view, you can 
use expressions like “enlightenment is here and now.” In the modality of the 
rhetoric or the dialectics of enlightenment, perfection is internal and in­
mediate (non-mediated). This sort of rhetoric can be applied to images of the 
buddha-fields as well. This is done, for instance, in the Vimalakirti-nirdesa's 
peculiar treatment of the myth of Abhirati, Aksobhya’s purified field. In this 
modality of the rhetoric or the dialectics of enlightenment, perfection is 
internal and in-mediate (non-mediated): the Pure Land is within you, and 
only within you. In this context “perfection” appears to be emptied of all 
forms of virtue and merit.13
But if we speak from the infinite point of view, we can say we share infi­
nite merit. This is, I would argue, the underlying assumption of the Smaller 
and the Larger Sukhavativyuha Sutras. The underlying metaphor in these 
texts contrasts sharply with the metaphor of zero merit. Both expressions are 
somehow equivalent, but the choice of metaphor is different and that is sig­
nificant.
The metaphor of infinite merit, furthermore, lends itself naturally for a 
narrative conception, a process image, of the attainment of buddhahood. It 
also highlights the gap between the imperfect and the perfect, the time lapse 
between the state of being imperfect and the achievement of enlightenment.
If we speak in terms of hope, then we are speaking of a person who con­
ceives of himself or herself as a non-ideal person. Hope is in the future 
because it is indirectly the expression of imperfection. But hope sometimes 
demands that we explain how the ideal will become reality. And one way to 
do this is to argue that “the perfect” facilitates or bestows perfection on “the
1 3 1 use the phrase “appears to be” advisedly, because I  am not completely persuaded that 
this is literally true. This peculiar form o f  the “rhetoric o f immediacy” is, at least in the 
Vimalakirti, clearly embedded in a broader argument about perfectibility and virtue.
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imperfect.” This can make perfect sense as an extension of the notion of 
transference of merit. Transference appears to be a way to avoid the diffi­
culties inherent to a doctrine of grace in a tradition that accepts the saving 
power of a “divinity” that is at the same time a human ascetic, and certainly 
falls short of being an all-powerful creator god. The situation is much more 
complicated than that, but this is not the place to explore this.
The actual or practical parameters of Buddhist belief are hard to discern. 
However, the literate tradition assumes that the roots of Buddhist doctrine 
are in the achievements of a human individual. This person, the Buddha 
Sakyamuni, pursued his self-interest (awakening), but, paradoxically, did so 
in the interest of others. When a Buddha experiences emptiness, he has 
experienced self-liberation. But most Indian Buddhist theologians were in 
agreement that emptiness was not enough. The expression sunyatd-karuna- 
garbha (“that which has at its corse both emptines and compassion”) was 
perhaps coined as shorthand for the claim that awakening and liberation are 
in essence a fusion of the vision of emptiness and a compassionate heart. To 
experience emptiness as self-liberation is not enough. A Buddha will also 
have to manifest that experience in compassion (karund). To conceive of a 
Buddha without compassion is to conceive of only half a Buddha. An equal­
ly standard formula defines the efforts of the Bodhisattva as a quest for self­
interest and other-interest. The first is cultivation of self and liberation 
resulting from a clear vision of emptiness—a realization of liberating power 
through knowledge. The second is regard for others, concern for their suf­
fering, and effort toward the alleviation of that suffering.
The two ideals coalesce in a number of ways, but arguably the most 
important point of contact in the present context is the correspondence 
between liberation as “freedom from,” realization as detachment, and saint­
ly virtue as generous giving. To be free is, in one important sense, to be 
detached, to let go of everything, but to be fully compassionate is also to let 
go, to give away. As stated succinctly in Santideva’s Bodhicarydvatdra 
(III. 10-11):14
10. All bodies, property and merit that I have acquired in the past, the
14 P. L. Vaidya, ed., Bodhicarydvatdra o f  Sdntideva, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, no. 12 
(Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute o f  Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit 
Learning, 1960), 39-40. The English translation is mine. For complete translation o f  this text, 
see Kate Crosby and Andrew Ski It on trans., The Bodhicarydvatdra (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).
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ones I have now, and the ones that I may acquire in the future, I 
surrender them all with indifference for the benefit of all living 
beings.
11. Nirvana means renunciation of all things, and my mind seeks this 
peace. If I must renounce all, it would be better to surrender it to 
all sentient beings.
Additionally, in terms of the metaphor of merit, we can also say that when 
one acquires infinite merit as the culmination of self-cultivation, one is able 
to share infinite merit as the culmination of concern for others. In terms of 
this pair of self and others, the metaphor of merit means that acquiring infi­
nite merit is one’s own salvation, and sharing infinite merit is rescuing oth­
ers. Hence, merit transference is, at least theoretically, an expression of 
compassion. Even if merit may be seen as ultimately empty, its transference, 
motivated by compassion, is fruitful, effective, and beneficial.15
This brings us to two additional paradoxes, which are implicit in the 
sutras: if merit is measureless, it is already shared; if it is shared, it is mea­
sureless. Merit should be empty, and to be empty means to be shared. So that 
only shared merit is true merit or good merit. In this way the dialectic of 
emptiness and compassion is embodied in the ritual of transference, in the 
ethical implications of transference, and, above all, in the mythology of 
transference.
Now I would like to discuss briefly the myth of the Pure Land sutras, and 
how it connects with the notion of merit. In speaking about the myth, I will 
use the term in a slightly personal way. I am going to use certain terms that 
might be confusing. When I speak of metaphor or symbol, I mean something 
that stands for something else because of a certain similarity. However, 
“stands for” in the context of the literary and theological imagination often 
means “is the same as.” If I connect symbols in a time sequence of descrip­
tions and events, i.e., in a narrative, then I have myth. A myth is often like a 
tapestry. The way that the threads of a tapestry intertwine can be analyzed in 
two ways: (1) as static or structural, and (2) as dynamic. In the Pure Land 
sutras, we can speak of metaphors of grace and we can also speak of the 
logic of grace. In this context the “logic” is partly based on the doctrine of 
transference, but is also rooted in the narrative sequence of the myth. This
15 Speaking in comparative terms, “the gift” is empty o f  any value other than the transac­
tional one. Giving away the gift is what turns it into a thing o f  value. Interestingly, in eco­
nomics this is only really true o f  true monies.
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means that “grace” is in this tradition both a ritual and a mythic category. 
This duality is embodied in the crucial term prasdda which means both the 
trusting disposition of the believer and the benevolent disposition of the 
Buddhas that grant salvation.
In the Pure Land sutras, the logic of grace is constructed with a narrative 
argument. The narrative is an argument of sorts. It is the story that makes 
possible, if not real, the connection between prasdda as trusting faith and 
prasdda as grace bestowing salvation. The conceptual and affective link is 
reinforced by the inner logic of the story. I will not spend time explaining the 
story of Dharmakara and Amitabha.16 Rather, I will focus briefly on its 
“internal logic.’*
The logic of the myth is part of a system of beliefs that is not necessarily 
shared by persons outside the cultural world of the believer’s presupposi­
tions. Presuppositions refer to those ideas that would have been known and 
accepted by those who read or heard the sutras. These presuppositions are 
the following: (1) the Bodhisattva’s vow; (2) the merit required to attain 
buddhahood, (3) the infinite merit (power, virtue) of a Buddha, and lastly, 
(4) belief in the existence of purified buddha-fields.
Each of these presuppositions needs a short explanation. First, (1) the 
notion of the Bodhisattva’s vow was linked to notions about the power of 
words and the power of resolution. Second, (2) the merit upon which the 
attainment of buddhahood is based is incalculable. By the time the 
Bodhisattva pronounces the vow he is already more than just an ordinary 
human being, and the power of his resolution, as well as the incalculable 
length and difficulty of his practice, produce an even greater merit. Third, (3) 
it was a matter of course that Buddhas have infinite merit, that is, once they 
attain buddhahood, the effect of their past actions continues to be a source of 
sacred power. Fourth, (4) it was not enough to believe in the cosmology of 
the buddha-fields; for there to be a religion of Buddhism in this style, the 
believer had to hold the possibility that at least one buddha-field had been 
purified.
One can see in the sutras the following arguments that are based on these 
assumptions. First, there was the belief in what is called “an act of truth,” 
and second the belief in the inherent truthfulness of the Bodhisattva as wit­
ness to his own virtue. Ihe “act of truth” (satya-kriya) consisted of a state-
16 This story can be found in Luis O. G6mez, trans., The Land ofBliss: The Paradise o f  the 
Buddha o f  Measureless Light, Sanskrit and Chinese Versions o f  the Sukhavativyuha Sutras 
(Honolulu: University o f  Hawai'i Press, 1996).
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ment in which a desired outcome or belief is caused or confirmed by a fac­
tual statement, without any implication or assumption that the two state­
ments are related causally. For instance, one may say “As I am the son of my 
father, may my own son recover from this illness.” This type of “moral” or 
“ritual” logic is found in cultures outside India as well. Related logical par­
adigms may be seen in prohibitive curses (e.g., “May the one who betrays 
me die an untimely death”) and oaths (e g., “May I die an untimely death, if 
I was the one who betrayed you,” or “If I stole your horse, then I am not the 
son of my noble father”).17
17 The connection between the secular and the sacred oath (the two are not easily distin­
guished) is discussed by van dcr Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, section 59.2. 
See also Friedrich Heiler, Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1961), 306 ff.
18 See Michel Hahn, trans., Joy fo r  the World: A Buddhist Play (Berkeley, CA: Dharma 
Publishing. 1974).
19 Ibid., stanza 40.
The order of such conditional statements varies. One could, for instance, 
declare “If I am the son of my father, then I am not the thief who stole your 
horse”—although a more idiomatic form in English would be, “As I am the 
son of my noble father, I have never touched your horse.” Regardless of 
variants in the order (which may indeed express subtle nuances), they all 
have the following underlying logical structure: I state X. If X is true, then Y 
necessarily follows. Now, X is true, hence Y is true. The thematic or objec­
tive connection between X and Y is ultimately secondary or unimportant. 
The important connection is between the veracity of the first statement 
(which is usually undeniable) and the reality expressed by the proposition Y.
Additionally, the laws of this logic have been pushed one step further, 
especially in religious discourse: the quasi-deductive statements of the acts 
of truth do not distinguish clearly between the establishment of truth and the 
generation of reality. A concrete example of this use of the act of truth is 
Lokananda’s act of truth in Candragomin’s version of the legend.18 In an act 
of selfless generosity, Lokananda has given away his wish-fulfilling crest­
jewel, but, since this jewel was an inborn integral part of his body, he has 
had it cut out from his own skull and is on the verge of dying. Then he makes 
his act of truth, which may be paraphrased as follows: “If it is a fact that I 
have never regretted giving away the jewel, then let a new crest-jewel grow 
back.”19 Needless to say, a new jewel appears and the wound is miraculous­
ly healed.
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The evident disjunction between content and power is seen in a well- 
known passage from Milindapanha studied by Eugene W. Burlingame.20 
The passage serves as a commentary on another classical story of a miracle 
wrought by an act of truth, the legend of King $ibi (Sivi), and the 
Milindapanha discusses the nature of the act of truth (saccakiriya in Pali). It 
presents the following example.21 King A&oka once asked if anyone could 
make the waters of the Ganges flow against the current. The courtesan 
Bandhumati said she could. She declared solemnly that she could make the 
waters of the Ganges turn back by an act of truth. And she did. Her act of 
truth was simple enough: she had never denied being a courtesan.
2 0  V. Trenckner, ed., The Milindapanho; Being Dialogues between King Miiinda and the 
Buddhist Sage Nagasena (London; Williams and Norgate, 1880), 121-22. Eugene W. 
Burlingame, “The Act o f  Truth (saccahriya)-. A  Hindu Spell and its Employment as a Psychic 
M otif in Hindu Fiction,” Journal o f  the Royal Asiatic Society (1917), 439-41. The story is 
also used by Heinrich Zimmer to illustrate Indian concepts o f  truth. See Philosophies o f  India 
(New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1951; Repr. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1969, 1971), 160-69. Zimmer connects this ancient belief to Gandhi's notion o f  satyagraha.
21 Trenckner, The Miiindapanho, 121-22.
The vows of Bodhisattvas can take a form similar to that of the act of 
truth. Conceived as a subtype of the act of truth, the vow is not only the 
solemn and powerful declaration of a supremely virtuous person. It can also 
take a different structural and logical form, becoming a conditional state­
ment in which the apodosis is factual or inevitable, and the protasis is a 
desired effect. In other words, the normal ontological order of the condition­
al has been inverted. Instead of saying “I will return if it does not rain,” (or, 
as an act of truth, “if it is true that I will return, then it will not rain”), one 
would say “If it should rain, then I am not true to my word that I shall 
return.” In a mythic or sacred context, this takes the formal characteristics of 
the following ideal or abstract statement: “if my liberation is not perfect, I 
will not achieve liberation.” Given the fact that the speaker is a perfect 
being, whose eventual (or past) achievement of perfection is a given, then 
the fact that his liberation is perfect is established. Furthermore, since the 
speaker is known to be true to his word, then the truth of the second clause 
guarantees the fact of the desired outcome expressed in the first clause.
The Bodhisattva’s vow is more than a simple act of truth, because the 
effect and the statement are identical, and because the vow is a solemn vow 
uttered and expressed by a truthful being—in other words, a being who 
always says the truth unquestionably—and the vow is spoken with the most
17
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selfless and virtuous intent. The speaker is also a living being who has 
already an exceptional degree o f merit, who is by the vow itself renouncing 
or shaping all past, present, and future merit, and who will become an omni­
scient person. Moreover, the vow itself produces merit.
The way in which these elements connect is the following. The Bod­
hisattva says, “May this happen, or else this will not happen.” To us, this 
seems like a contradiction, but at a certain level o f myth and rhetoric it is a 
very convincing argument, because the Bodhisattva is saying, “if X then Y,” 
but expressed in the following way: “if  not-Y then not-X; but X is going to 
happen, therefore Y must happen.” A Bodhisattva is a truthful being, he 
makes a vow to buddhahood, so we know he will be a Buddha; in other 
words, if  you are a believer, these things follow one from the other.
But even more than that, the person who is listening to the sutra knows 
that the sutra is referring to the past, but that it is somehow a timeless or per­
fective past. Specifically, in the Larger Sukhavativyuha, that mythological 
past is a time in which Dharmakara has already become a Buddha. 
Therefore, it is not only that we should expect him to become a Buddha, but 
that he is actually a Buddha. So he says, to paraphrase, “If living beings in 
my purified field are not in such a condition, then I will not become a Budd­
ha.” But he is a Buddha; therefore, his purified field must already be as he 
describes it.
This is one way to express the mystery or the metaphor of grace. Since this 
is closely connected to merit, in this case content and the power of the act o f 
truth are closely related. Speaker, vow, virtue, and fruit are in fact much 
more closely intertwined with truth and the power of the word. But they are 
also closely connected to the accomplishments and virtues of Buddhas and 
Bodhisattvas.
One can think o f this mystery in simple psychological terms as the puz­
zling effect o f receiving something that one does not deserve, and never hav­
ing to pay back the gift. This is a rare event if  one calculates the total sum of 
exchanges in an individual human being’s life.22 However, when individual
22 The parallel to the logic o f  gift exchanges in the secular context is obvious, and further 
confirmed by the etymological and semantic connections o f the word “grace” to some 
Western expressions o f  gratitude: Spanish gracias, Italian gratzie  (which, derived from Latin 
grants, go back to the idea that the gift is meant to please the recipient— Compare Sanskrit 
anugrhito ’smi). French merci highlights the presumed or normative affective state behind the 
gift (pity or compassion); whereas English “thank” suggests the normative state o f  mind 
(thoughtfulness, hence other-regard).
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events, rather than a total sum, are considered, people often believe that they 
do receive, or that others do receive things that they neither deserve nor need 
to repay. This is the spectrum destiny-fortune-grace.
Ln Buddhist terms, this psychological phenomenon can be glossed as fol­
lows. Grace is both receiving and sharing infinite merit, and infinite merit 
has been shared since beginningless time.23 In other words, the moment you 
define merit as being beyond quantification, it is beyond time and beyond 
possession. Now this has interesting implications in terms o f experience and 
meaning. First, the connection between merit and grace can be seen, as I said 
before, as a critique o f the notion of quantifiable merit. It also gives a new 
meaning to the vow, and a new importance to the Name o f the Buddha. The 
sacred Name is as much an embodiment of buddhahood as the body o f a 
Buddha. It is a word that expresses the essence o f buddhahood and a sound 
that manifests its presence. More important, a Word becomes the sacred 
presence in the same way that the logic o f the myth, by seeming to defy com­
mon logic, brings together futurity and actuality. The name of the Buddha 
brings together futurity, birth in the Pure Land, and actuality, the presence of 
grace. Needless to say, it also integrates the past, because this Name is the 
Vow.
Because the Name contains the essence and the presence o f the Buddha, 
it embodies the Vow as living practice, and it also embodies the name o f all 
Buddhas so that we can speak o f an actualized vow, and we can also speak 
o f the Vow as a moving force and guide in the path. This expresses, in the 
Indian tradition at least, the two aspects o f hope: faith and effort. Hope can 
lead me to have faith, which in this context is more trust than confessional 
belief. But it can also lead me to make effort. Because I am confident o f the 
outcome, I apply myself to the causes o f the fruit I desire. Both elements I 
think are seen in Indian Buddhism very clearly, so that the notion that Indian 
Buddhism is a religion without faith or hope is I think very simplistic. 
However, Indian Buddhism does not see faith and effort as being as much in 
tension as Japanese Buddhism tends to do. In the same way, the tension 
between grace and merit, at least in Mahayana, is not as strong as it would 
seem to be in Japan. But this is not the same thing as denying a continuity of
23 For similar notions in Japanese Buddhism outside Pure Land traditions, see Dogen’s 
essays “Effort” (Gyoji fr ft) and “Worship” (Kuyd-shobuisu These essays are
found in Terada Toru 1  and Mizuno Yaoko 7 ,  eds., Degen jI tl. 2 vols.
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970-72), vol. 1, 165-221, and vol. 2, 382-413, respectively.
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tradition, derivation, and metaphor. One of the implications of what I have 
just said is that Pure Land Buddhism is consistent with mainstream 
Mahayana. The idea of a traditional link between Mahayana and the 
Japanese Pure Land tradition was first inspired in me in an all too brief con­
versation with Professor Yamaguchi Susumu in 1969, and later when I read 
his arguments in Daijo toshite no Jodo (Pure Land as Mahayana).24 He saw 
the fundamental link in the formula “emptiness is form, and form is empti­
ness.” Of course, the connection between this doctrinal dictum and Pure 
Land generally had been suggested long before, in the writings of Tan-luan. 
But Professor Yamaguchi made the connection to Japanese Pure Land and 
tried to see the link as a necessary one. That is, Pure Land doctrine was seen 
as a logical outcome of the nature of the synonymity or equation (sokuze) 
“form is emptiness, emptiness is form.”
24 Yamaguchi Susumu lb □  £ ,  Daijo toshite no jo d o  £  L X (Tokyo: Risdsha. 
1963).
25A critique o f  the notion o f  “Pure Land faith” as simplified concession to popular belief 
has been questioned by historians, but awaits a theological critique. Because this notion (and, 
I would argue, misconception) has been used apologetically to much advantage in the past, 
even Pure Land Buddhists themselves are reluctant to examine it critically. Barth, in the pas­
sage quoted above (Die hrchliche D ogm atic  375; English version, 342) shows the flip side 
o f  this apologetic, arguing for the superiority o f  a doctrine o f  truth (meaning, naturally, his 
own theological position) over one o f  “concession.” Needless to say, I would not defend the 
sectarian preferences that Barth derives, willy-nilly, from his otherwise illuminating reflec­
tions.
I am inclined to think that, historically, faith in the purified fields and the 
vows of the Bodhisattva were primary. That is, such faith did not derive from 
an abstract formulation or vision of the meaning of emptiness—most likely 
it even preceded historically the formation of the great systems of Mahayana 
philosophy. But, regardless of one’s views as to the priority of this abstract 
notion over the so-called “simple” faith of the Buddhism of hope, the con­
cept of the identity of form and emptiness may be construed as a pertinent 
theological commentary on faith.25 Even if it is only an abstract reformula­
tion, it is an appropriate one, insofar as the kind of faith we find in these tra­
ditions is a faith that converts the emptiness of the holy into the fullness of 
the sacred power of salvation. It is an abstract and, admittedly, intellectual- 
ized formulation, a secondary rationalization, if you will. But it is also an 
apposite summary for the idea that merit is ultimately empty, and hence pli­
able, flexible, so that it is fluid, transferable. Merit is empty because it can­
not be possessed, because it is ephemeral, and hence it is best realized when
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we give it away. Who better to embody this fact than the persons who have 
the most merit and give it away without hesitation: namely, the Bod­
hisattvas.
I have therefore suggested here that the idea of faith in the Pure Land—as 
hope of rebirth in the Pure Land—follows from the metaphor of merit itself. 
In other words, the notion of merit leads, in some paradoxical way, to the 
notion of grace. Then finally, in a strange but not surprising way, Pure Land 
appears as another example of the critique of merit, an expression of the 
same notion of “non-duality” and the emptiness of form that Westerners see 
as so central to Mahayana Buddhism. In this sense, Pure Land hope is also 
an assertion equivalent to the formula “emptiness is form.” But it is not 
derived from this formula (either philosophically or historically), but from a 
parallel development that I rather characterize as mythical—that is, from the 
way certain symbolic and narrative processes were interpreted in practices 
of faith and hope.
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